We examine the chief executive officer (CEO) optimism effect on managerial motives for cash holdings and find that optimistic and non-optimistic managers have significantly dissimilar purposes for holding more cash. This is consistent with both theory and evidence that optimistic managers are reluctant to use external funds. Optimistic managers hoard cash for growth opportunities, use relatively more cash for capital expenditure and acquisitions, and save more cash in adverse conditions. By contrast, they hold fewer inventories and receivables and their precautionary demand for cash holdings is less than that of non-optimistic managers. In addition, we consider debt conservatism in our model and find no evidence that optimistic managers' cash hoarding is related to their preference to use debt conservatively. We also document that optimistic managers hold more cash in bad times than non-optimistic managers do. Our work highlights the crucial role that CEO characteristics play in shaping corporate cash holding policy.
3 also been used in the context of managerial overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate 2005a) , although the term overconfidence is more generally associated with situations where managers are over-estimating the returns or rewards associated with certain decisions (Hackbarth 2008; Malmendier et al. 2008) . However, the managerial characteristic of over-estimating rewards has also been labelled as optimism (Heaton 2002; Englmaier 2010) .
Although our approach is most closely related to those studies that use the term optimism (e.g. Puri and Robinson 2007; Campbell, Galleyer, Johnson, Rutherford and Stanley 2011) , these studies and this paper do not preclude the possibility of a role for managerial overconfidence. The difficulty in distinguishing between optimism and overconfidence is further compounded by the literature itself using similar options holdings data in empirical applications. 2 In this paper, we use the term optimism to maintain consistency with Campbell et al. (2011) , as our methodology most closely follows this earlier study. Readers, however, will still see the term overconfidence mentioned in this paper when we refer to corresponding prior studies.
There is a growing literature that indicates managers make biased decisions on financial and investment policies when their judgment is distorted by optimism. We summarize optimistic managers' major characteristics, that are distinct from non-optimistic managers, here: First, biased managers prefer internal funds to external funds for investment projects and are more likely than other managers to raise debt than equity (Heaton 2002; Malmendier and Tate 2005a) . 3 Second, firms managed by overconfident managers pay less dividends (Cordeiro 2009; Deshmukh et al. 2010) . That is, overconfident managers overestimate firms' future performance and prefer retaining cash flows for potential investment opportunities. In turn, they are reluctant to pay dividends to shareholders. Third, optimistic and overconfident managers overinvest if they overvalue firm future earnings Tate 2005a, 2005b; Puri and Robinson 2007) and underinvest (and reject positive net present value (NPV) projects) if they have to seek external funds (Heaton 2002) . Fourth, Liu and Taffler (2008) and Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to conduct mergers and acquisitions than non-optimistic CEOs.
2 For instance, Campbell et al. (2011) use ExecuComp's exercisable options data as the proxy for CEO optimism, which in their setting is closely related to the CEO overconfidence measure of Malmendier and Tate (2005a) , who use a dataset combining stock ownership and a set of option packages provided by Brian Hall and David Yermack from Hall and Liebman (1998) and Yermack (1995) . 3 In general, external financing is more expensive than internal financing for firms, particularly for financially constrained firms. Biased managers are much more reluctant to use outside financing than rational managers, since they believe firm value is underestimated in the financial markets and the cost of external financing is thus overpriced. Malmendier and Tate (2005a) find that corporate investment decisions made by overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) are substantially related to internal funds. Heaton (2002) builds a model to show that optimistic managers will decline positive NPV projects if they have to fund externally for these projects. Hackbarth (2008) shows theoretically that biased managers have higher debt levels than unbiased managers.
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exercise their options, when there are restrictions and regulations on short-selling their shares (Malmendier and Tate, 2005) . Such exercise activity, or indeed the continued holding of in-the-money options, will reflect the manager's perspective on their firm. This could reasonably be assumed to reflect a level of optimism. Since managers normally own a large amount of options, which puts them in a situation of high exposure to the idiosyncratic risk of their firms, holding on to deep in-the-money options reflects a high level of optimism. 5 Influential studies that have used this measurement approach include Billett and Qian (2008) , Liu and Taffler (2008) , Campbell et al. (2011) , and Hirshleifer et al (2012) .
In addition, we examine an alternative CEO optimism measure, firm investment levels, as a further robustness test. As emphasized by Campbell et al. (2011) , this should avoid the direct connection between managerial incentives and managerial compensations. We use this as a reflection of how positive a manager feels towards the firm's investment activity and its future performance. The regression models for examining motives for cash holdings that we use in this paper draw upon the models proposed by Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) , who find that average firms would hold more cash if their growth opportunities are strong.
Our results can be summarized as follows. 6 First, we confirm that both optimistic and non-optimistic managers accumulate cash over the sample period. However, optimistic managers tend to hold more cash than non-optimistic managers. The mean cash ratio of optimistic managers is 0.145, higher than the value of 0.120 for non-optimistic managers. This is consistent with theories that optimistic managers pay less dividends and prefer to utilize internal funds. Second, optimistic managers tend to reserve more cash for larger deals. We find a positive and significant relation between cash holdings and research and development (R&D) spending for firms managed by optimistic managers. Third, optimistic managers have relatively more volatile cash balances. Our results indicate that the cash balances of optimistic managers vary more than those of non-optimistic managers and do so in response to changes in R&D spending. Absolute cash changed by $3.11 per $1.00 of R&D for optimistic firms, which is more than double that in the case of non-optimistic firms (where absolute cash changed by $1.50 per $1.00 increase in R&D). 5 In the study of the tradeoff between undiversified executives and their exercisable options by Hall and Murphy (2002) , the authors find that risk-averse and undiversified executives (defined as those that hold more than 67% of their wealth in company stock) hold in-the-money options less longer than relatively less risk-averse and less undiversified executives. That is, greater risk aversion and under-diversification lead the manager to exercise options early or immediately after the vesting period. From this we could reasonably infer that a manager who is risk-averse and undiversified can be considered to be optimistic if they persist in holding deep in-the-money options, since this would not be expected if they are risk averse and hold too many shares. 6 All models include year and industry fixed effects and the results are robust to clustering standard errors by firm for heteroskedasticity and arbitrary serial correlation.
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By contrast, cash balances for optimistic firms do not respond to acquisitions or capital investment differently to those of non-optimistic firms. Fourth, capital expenditures and acquisition expenditures are negatively correlated with cash holdings, meaning that firms with optimistic managers take on more cash-financed capital investment and acquisitions. Fifth, CEO optimism leads firms to hold fewer inventories and receivables. Unlike IPO firms with sufficient money, non-IPO optimistic firms that plan to reserve more cash have to reduce their net working capital.
We also report that optimistic managers save less than non-optimistic managers for precautionary purposes. This relates to the theory that optimistic managers underestimate risk. Their cash saving motives are mainly for growth opportunities, not for future uncertainty. Finally, we find that optimistic managers are more sensitive to market conditions and save more cash than non-optimistic managers when times are bad. Our results are robust to a variety of model specifications and alternative CEO optimism measures (firm investment).
The next section discusses the research design. Section 3 describes the data, including sample selection and the main measures of optimistic managers, and presents some summary statistics. Section 4 presents the main empirical analysis, including robustness tests, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
Research design
Our work is motivated by the study of Heaton (2002) who emphasizes that optimistic CEOs systematically overestimate firm performance and tend to overinvest in negative NPV projects and underinvest in positive NPV projects if they have to seek external funds as a consequence. Similarly, we consider optimistic CEOs as managers who expect future outcomes to be better than they really are. The objective of our study is to see whether this overinvestment-underinvestment trade-off triggers optimistic managers to vary their cash balances over time, so that cash holdings may appear to be at different levels to those of non-optimistic firms and possibly more volatile.
Consistent with the prior studies that have shown that optimistic managers have different characteristics that influence their decision making, we also seek to determine whether the motivations for hoarding cash and the use of cash holdings are different in firms governed by optimistic managers.
Our modeling approach uses the cross section regression developed by Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al. (2009) , which they used to identify the determinants of cash holdings by firms. The model regresses the cash-toasset ratio onto determinants reflecting investment opportunities (including the market-to-book ratio and capital expenditures), size, leverage, growth opportunities, dividends, large investments (acquisition activities), and precautionary savings motives. Also, following Opler et al, (1999) and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) , we add two new 7 control variables -managerial ownership percentage and the square of managerial ownership percentage to capture the concave relationship between cash holdings and managerial ownership, which these and other studies have identified.
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We recast the above cash holdings model by adding interaction terms involving CEO optimism. Therefore, our model not only examines the determinants of cash holdings for average firms but also effectively shows the incremental impact of CEO optimism on cash holdings associated with firm characteristics. The cash model for each 
where the dependent variable is the proxy for cash holdings and the explanatory variables include a set of firm characteristics and these variables interacted with the CEO optimism dummy variable.
Firms have several motives to save more cash, such as investment opportunities, financial distress costs, growth opportunities, and industry cash flow risk. The main proxies for investment opportunities are the market-tobook ratio (Q) and capital expenditures (Capex). The variable R&D represents the role of growth opportunities.
When firms expand their technology development and performance, they may increase their cash levels to support this. Firms may issue debt for investment opportunities, which mean that they would not need to use cash to fund all projects. For optimistic managers, internal funding is prioritized; they therefore consider the allocation of cash and debt funds on these projects particularly important. The variable Indusig, or industry sigma, measures cash flow risk, which is the proxy for the precautionary saving motive. The greater cash flow risk, the more cash is reserved.
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The variable Size captures the economies of scales in cash and we expect a negative relation between cash holdings and firm size. The cash flow-to-assets ratio (Cashflow) can be either negatively or positively related to cash holdings (e.g., Kim, Mauer, and Sherman 1998; Almeida et al. 2004) . Firms with greater earnings or those presumed 7 Managerial ownership has been found to influence cash holdings in many countries, see, for example, Luo and Hachiya (2005) for Japan and Yu, Sopranzetti, and Lee (2015) for Taiwan. 8 Han and Qiu (2007) and Riddick and Whited (2009) level, managers may seek to reduce cash holdings, giving rise to a concave relationship with ownership. The data used to measure each of the explanatory variables is described in Section 3 below and in more detail in Appendix 1.
To capture the effects of managerial optimism, we add to the base-line determinants of cash holdings a dummy variable (D) that indicates whether the manager of the firm is optimistic or not. The proxy for CEO optimism is determined by the average percent moneyness of the options held by a CEO. The details of the optimism measure are given in Section 3 below. In addition, we include interaction terms of the optimism dummy variable with each of the potential determinants of cash flow holdings. This design helps to explicitly explain whether optimistic managers have distinct cash-financing plans and how differently they hoard cash.
We also examine a number of augmented specifications of the cash model as robustness checks. First, we examine whether there is a tendency for firms to reduce their net working capital (which contains noncash components of liquid assets) to hoard cash. To do so, firms that have gone public in the past five years are excluded from the model because initial public offering (IPO) firms hold large amounts of cash from issuing equity.
9
Excluding IPO firms enables us to distinguish the sources of cash hoarding. Next, we incorporate the sum of net debt and equity issuance to assets as an additional variable in the cash holdings model to make sure our findings are not related to net issuances. In further analysis, we control for any influence of debt conservatism and market conditions. As a final robustness check, we follow Campbell et al. (2011) and use firm investment data to measure optimism. This is because the results of Malmendier and Tate (2005) , Campbell et al. (2011) and Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2011) show that managerial optimism appears to have influence on firm investment.
3 Data description and summary statistics and 6999) 10 ; (2) each firm included in the sample has valid compensation and firm-level data for at least two years.
These criteria result in 1,001 observations in the optimism sample and 4,902 observations in the non-optimistic sample. Table 1 summarizes the data selection process and outcome.
[ Campbell et al. (2011) is also used by Malmendier et al. (2011) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012) . Malmendier et al. (2011) use this measure alongside their own options-based measure and find consistent results after controlling for debt conservatism and market conditions. Hirshleifer et al. (2012) use this measure to study the relation between CEO optimism and investment in innovation. 12 These definitions are inspired by the work of Campbell et al. (2011) , who create measures of CEO optimism based on stock option holding. They classify high-optimistic managers as those who hold exercisable options that are more than 100% in the money, in a given year. To be classified as high-optimistic in a given year, managers must have held options that are more than 100% in the money for at least two of the years in the sample. In this paper, we focus on optimistic managers; thus we use the high-optimistic measure to define an optimistic manager. Their paper defines rational-optimistic managers who hold and/or exercise options with moneyness between 30% and 100%. In addition, they define low-optimistic managers as those who exercise options that are less than 30% in the money and do not hold options greater than 30% in the money. We group these latter two cases and define moneyness less than 100% non-optimistic. Although the optimism benchmark is designed to separate managers who are comparatively positive about the future from those that are not so positive, it is possible that firms holding options with moneyness near the 100% boundary may be less well identified as optimistic or non-optimsitic. The approach to dealing with this in prior studies has been to consider an alternative boundary point, and we adopt that approach here also. We follow the alternative definition of Campbell et al. (2011) that optimistic managers are those having stock options with a moneyness in excess of 67%, which is itself inspired by the overconfidence measure of Malmendier and Tate (2005a) . Our sample with the 67% cutoff generated 1,908 optimistic observations and 6,790 non-optimistic observations. Campbell et al. (2011) flow-to-assets ratio and the net working capital-to-assets ratio are winsorized at the 1% level. The capital expenditure-to-assets ratio, the R&D-to-sales ratio, the acquisitions-to-assets ratio, and the industry cash flow risk are winsorized at the 1% level. The one-year lagged value of the leverage-to-assets ratio is winsorized to lie between 0 and 1. 11 3.2 Summary statistics Table 2 presents summary statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables for optimistic managers and nonoptimistic managers based on two panels using the 100% and 67% CEO optimism cutoffs, respectively.
[ Table 2 ]
The cash ratio is right-skewed for both groups, which is in line with the literature (e.g., Kim et al. 1998; Almeida et al. 2004; Ferreira and Vilela 2004; Bates et al. 2009 ). The mean and median values for the cash ratio of optimistic managers (for the 100% cut-off) are 14.5% and 8.7%, respectively, statistically higher (p < 0.01) than those of non-optimistic managers (12.0% and 6.0%, respectively), consistent with our expectations. This also strongly supports prior studies of the effects of CEO optimism, which find that optimistic and overconfident CEOs demand internal funds, prefer to pay less dividends, overinvest in projects, and invest in more acquisitions than nonoptimistic managers.
Optimistic managers seem to undertake bigger investment than non-optimistic managers, since all their mean
and median values for Q, capital expenditures, R&D, and acquisitions are higher than for non-optimistic managers.
The mean Q for optimistic managers is 3.216, which is higher (p < 0.01) than the mean of non-optimistic managers (1.943), suggesting that optimistic managers have better future investment opportunities than non-optimistic managers. 15 The upper quartile of optimistic managers has two times more R&D expenditures and acquisition outflows than the corresponding quartile of non-optimistic managers. These figures indicate that optimistic managers have larger investments than non-optimistic managers.
The mean and median leverage of firms with optimistic managers are 18.3% and 16.5%, respectively, lower than the figures of 22.7% and 21.6%, respectively, of firms with non-optimistic managers (p < 0.01). This information implies that, on average, firms with optimistic managers have less debt issuance than non-optimistically managed firms, which is consistent with the evidence of Malmendier et al. (2011) , where firms with overconfident managers are debt conservative and issue debt to levels lower than the point of maximum tax benefits.
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We also notice that the percentage of dividend-paying firms in the optimistic group is 49%. This is significantly less than the corresponding figure of 59.5% in the non-optimistic group. These statistics are consistent with the theory that most firms governed by optimistic managers are less likely to pay dividends. When the optimism criterion is loosened, which means that the cutoff is changed from 100% to 67% moneyness, the number of dividend payers in the optimistic group increases to 54.3%, which is significantly different from 59% of the nonoptimistic group at the 1% significance level. Also, the difference in the managerial ownership percentage between optimistic and non-optimistic groups is statistically insignificant. However, the square term of managerial ownership in the optimistic group is slightly lower than that of the non-optimistic group. Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation matrices of the set of exogenous variables with each other and the cash holdings for the optimistic and non-optimistic groups based on both the 100% and 67% CEO optimism cutoffs (Panels A and B, respectively). Cash holdings are positively related to the market-to-book ratio, R&D spending, and industry cash flow risk (p < 0.01) in both the optimistic and non-optimistic groups. In particular, cash has a closer relation with R&D in the optimistic group than in the non-optimistic group. We also find that cash in firms with optimistic managers has weaker connections with their lagged leverage levels and acquisition expenditures compared to that in firms with non-optimistic managers. The debt conservatism measure, Kink, is positively related to cash holdings, and the relationship is stronger in the optimistic group than in the non-optimistic group. It is also worth noting that the correlations between cash holdings and managerial ownership variables (Own and Own2) are positive and significant in the non-optimistic group and not significantly different from zero in the optimistic group.
[ Table 3 ] Moreover, the variability of cash balances in the optimistic group is greater than that in the non-optimistic group over the sample period (p < 0.01). [ Table 4 ]
[ Figure 1] 
Empirical analysis

What factors dominate the tendency of corporations to hoard cash?
The summary statistics show that the cash holdings of our full sample and two sub-sample groups (optimistic and non-optimistic) have increased in recent years. We begin by examining whether the increase in cash holdings can be explained by firm characteristics, without the inclusion of the CEO optimism effect. Since the ordinary least squares (OLS) model may be inappropriate if the distribution of the dependent variable (Cash in our case) is highly positively skewed in the (0, 1) range, we also employ the beta distribution (Beta) model which is well suited for use in proportional data analysis, as a robustness tool. 18 In Table 5 , Panel A, we provide summary statistics of the distribution of cash holdings for the full sample to that clearly shows the high positive skewness of Cash. Figure 2 also shows the skewness in the ratio whereby the majority of our sample has the cash ratio ranging between 0% and 20%. These findings support our use of the Beta distribution model.
In Panel B of Table 5 , we show both OLS and Beta regression results. All models in our study include year and industry fixed effects. The standard errors are adjusted for firm clustering. The sign and significance of all variables are consistent with our predictions (in the Appendix 1) and those documented by Opler et al (1999) and Bates et al. (2009). 14 [ Table 5 ]
The results for both models are qualitatively similar. Specifically, both models show that R&D captures the main incentive to demand excessive cash. In the OLS model, the coefficient of R&D is 0.734, implying that a 10% increase in the ratio of R&D to sales needs a $0.00734 increase in cash holdings (scaled by total assets). The Beta model implies a $0.03977 increase in cash holdings for every 10% increase in the ratio of R&D to sales. Net working capital, capital expenditures, leverage, and acquisition activities have strong negative coefficients. The less net working capital, the more cash holdings. This result implies that firms hoarding more cash now than before have less inventory and receivables. In addition, the statistically significant coefficients of capital expenditures (-0.677 (OLS); -5.112 (Beta)) and acquisition expenditures (-0.422 (OLS); -3.392 (Beta)) show that big investment expenses lead firms to consume their cash holdings, while there is a steady increase in cash holdings for the full sample over the period.
Leverage can be negatively or positively related to cash holdings. If firms have great hedge needs for future investment, they will prefer holding more cash than lowering leverage, leading to a positive relation between leverage and cash holdings. However, if firms' financing sources are restrained, to some extent these firms need to use cash to reduce their leverage in case of default. The coefficient of Laglev estimated in our regressions is negative (p < 0.01 in both models), implying that average firms' debt capacity is constrained and firms will spend more cash to reduce leverage.
The coefficient of the dividend dummy is negative (p < 0.01). In general, dividend-paying firms hold less cash than non-dividend-paying firms, which is consistent with the OLS statistics of Bates et al. (2009 To examine whether CEO optimism influences their motives for corporate cash holdings, we extend the Beta regression model in Table 5 by including the interaction terms of the firm characteristics with CEO optimism dummy variable. Results are shown in Table 6 . Models 1 and 2 of Table 6 provide regression results of equation (1).
We find that the CEO optimism effect does not affect the overall cash holdings (which can be seen from the . 20 This means that only the extremely optimistic group has this characteristic.
[ Table 6 ] So far, we found that optimistic managers and non-optimistic managers have different cash holding motives.
Our next examination is on whether optimistic managers vary firms' cash balances over time more than non-optimistic managers. Models 3 and 4 of Table 6 re-estimate Models 1 and 2 using the absolute cash ratio change.
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We replace laglev with Lev (leverage in year t) as there is no endogeneity issue with cash change. Model 3 shows that the 1.61 (p < 0.05) greater variation in cash balances is explained by R&D for firms with optimistic managers.
This test further supports those findings that the optimistic group has relatively volatile cash balances, as seen earlier in Figure 1 and the results in Table 6 . When the optimism boundary is relaxed to 67%, the coefficient of R&D is insignificant. This implies that cash balances are sensitive to a relatively stronger level of the CEO optimistic effect.
Model specification robustness
Our sample heretofore contains some firms that have gone public within the last five years and their cash holdings are thus at a high level because of lumpy capital raising. In theory, these IPO firms are cash rich and have no need to save cash from holding less non-cash net working capital. In this section, we exclude young firms in our sample to eliminate the specific effect attributable to IPO firms. Using the sample of non-IPO firms, we control three issues to strengthen our test on the CEO optimism effect on corporate cash holdings motives. We incorporate net issuances to assets to control for the possibility that the increase in cash holdings may result from issuing more equity and debt. The net issuances (NI) are measured as the total of debt issuance and equity sales minus the sum of debt retirement and equity repurchases. The bottom tail of NI is winsorized at the 1% level.
Models 1 and 2 of Table 7 augment equation (1) by including the net issuance variable. With this adjusted specification, the optimistic group continues to have a stronger savings motive for growth opportunities and uses more cash-financed capital investment and acquisitions than the non-optimistic group. There is a significant difference in the increase in cash through debt and equity issuance between the optimistic and non-optimistic samples. Since external funds are limited to optimistic-manager firms, these firms intend to save more cash out of cash flow and save more money raised from issuance. Furthermore, an estimate of -0.551 (p < 0.10) for D*NWC indicates that optimistic managers hold even fewer inventories and receivables than non-optimistic managers. This is because optimistic managers lean excessively on internal funds, which leads them to act as though they are financially constrained. As such, the likelihood that these firms would substitute net working capital for cash increases because net working capital consists of non-cash financial assets. The precautionary savings motive is negatively associated with an increase in cash at the 5% significance level, signalling that the desire to undertake 21 The absolute cash ratio change is defined as the absolute value of the current cash ratio minus the lagged cash ratio. Our data period for calculating the absolute cash change is between 1992 and 2010 and so the final sample period for this absolute-cash-change model is from 1993 to 2010. precautionary savings is relatively weak for optimistic managers. This finding is in line with the theory that optimistic managers underestimate the inherent uncertainty and riskiness of earnings (e.g., Heaton 2002; Goel and Thakor 2008; Hackbarth 2008; Gervais et al. 2011 ).
[ Table 7 With the 67% CEO optimism cutoff, the industry sigma and NWC variables that proxy for precautionary savings and substitution for cash, respectively, are insignificant for optimistic managers. This result indicates that the relation between optimism and underestimation of risk depends upon the definition of optimism. Similarly, optimistic CEOs' cash demand from internal liquid assets seems to relate to how excessively optimistic CEOs are about future investment opportunities. We also note that the Chi-square value is slightly higher with this NI specification. Malmendier et al. (2011) have addressed the issue that if overconfident CEOs are debt and equity conservative, then they would prefer using internal finance rather than external finance. Our second augmented specification allows us to test the relation between debt conservatism and the CEO optimism effect on cash holding motives. We incorporate debt conservatism, measured by the variable (Kink), and its interaction with the CEO optimism effect (D)
into the model. Kink is the amount of interest required to make the tax rate function slope downward, divided by the actual interest expense (Graham 2000) . The greater the value of Kink, the more debt conservative the firm is. 22 We match our previous non-IPO sample with kink data and obtain 4,827 firm-year observations between 1993 and 2009.
We compute the Pearson-Spearman correlations between Kink and the presented cash holdings variables. 23 These results show that Kink is not highly correlated with our variables, thus allowing Kink to be added to our regression models as another explanatory variable without collinearity concerns.
Models 3 and 4 of Table 7 present results to include the variables Kink and D*Kink for the 100% and 67% cutoffs, respectively. Results are consistent with our findings that the motives for cash holdings are significantly different between optimistic and non-optimistic managers, even when optimistic managers are debt conservative. An alternative way to examine whether the results are not driven by debt conservatism is to have the three-way interactions (CEO optimism, cash holdings controls, and Kink) included in the model. Results are reported in the Appendix 3. We find a relatively low effect (in the 100% cutoff) or even no significant effect (in the 67% cutoff) of debt conservatism on the sensitivity of cash holdings and growth opportunities for the optimistic sample. This finding indicates that debt conservatism is not the main reason optimistic managers hoard cash for growth opportunities. We therefore document that the incentive for firms with optimistic managers to hold more cash for growth opportunities does not appear to be heavily influenced by firm debt conservatism. We also find that companies with more acquisition expenses and a higher leverage ratio are less responsive to cash hoarding in determining firm debt conservatism.
Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) document that excess cash holdings are mainly for future cash flow shocks in bad times while credit lines are used for future investment potentials when times are good. Although the focus of our study and theirs is different, controlling for market-type factors can help us analyze the sensitivity of firm characteristics determining cash holdings to market conditions.
For Models 5 and 6 of Table 7 , we employ four proxies for market conditions on top of the inclusion of net issuances and debt conservatism to the regression model based on the 100% and 67% cutoff, respectively. The first two measures are current and lagged buy-and-hold market returns; the last two are current and lagged standard deviations of market returns. We compute the product of the monthly CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ/Arca valueweighted market index over one year and over one lagged year, corresponding to the firm fiscal year buy-and-hold returns (BHR) and one-year-lagged buy-and-hold returns (lagBHR), respectively. We also calculate the standard deviations of the monthly CRSP market index over one year and over one lagged year to capture market volatility 23 The Pearson-Spearman correlations table is available upon request.
(Stdev) and one-year-lagged market volatility (lagStdev), respectively. The results based on the 100% cutoff remain qualitatively similar to those without the market conditions variables in Table 7 . The extremely optimistic group is found to have distinct cash holding behavior for growth opportunities and precautionary motives. This result is not repeated in the 67% cutoff, which suggests that corporate cash policies are sensitive to the definition of CEO optimism. We also find that the optimistic group would save more cash when times are bad (the estimates of D*lagBHR are 0.383, p < 0.05 in the 100% cutoff and 0.434, p <0.01 in the 67% cutoff).
Robustness to an alternative measure of optimism
We use an alternative measure of CEO optimism as a robustness check for the effect of CEO optimism on corporate cash holdings and find further consistency in our results. Our alternative measure comes from the work of Campbell et al. (2011) who suggest firm characteristic as another managerial optimism measure. Goel and Thakor (2008) document that firms with extremely overconfident managers tend to overinvest in risky projects. Thus, corporate decisions on investment inputs could be influenced by CEO optimism (e.g., Campbell et al. 2011; Gervais et al.
2011). The work of Malmendier and Tate (2005a), Malmendier et al. (2011) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012) also indicates that the relation between overconfidence and investments is positive. With this important notion in mind,
we use firm investment inputs to construct the alternative measure of CEO optimism.
To begin, we sort firms each year based on three separate industry-adjusted investment rates: (i) the capital investment rate (used in Campbell et al. 2011) , (ii) the acquisition investment rate, and (iii) the R&D investment rate. 24 We identify optimistic managers as those for firms in the union of the top quintiles of each of the three investment rate groups for one year or two consecutive years, respectively. In Table 8 , Model 1 reports the results where firms are in the top group of investment rate for one year while Model 2 restricts the requirement to two consecutive years. This method yields a sample of 4,736 (4,695) total CEO-firm-year observations for Model 1 (2) and there are 954 (847) in the optimism sub-sample.
[ Table 8 ]
We find results consistent with the earlier findings that CEO optimism leads firms to have different cash holdings models. That is, using capital expenditures/acquisitions/R&D expenses to classify optimistic managers, we 24 The industry-adjusted capital (acquisition; R&D) investment rate is defined as the capital (acquisition; R&D) investment rate minus the median of capital (acquisition; R&D) investment rates in the same industry. Capital expenditures are scaled by property, plant, and equipment; acquisition and R&D expenses are scaled by book assets.
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find evidence similar to that of our main analysis: Firms with optimistic managers save more cash for R&D opportunities. Moreover, the optimistic group pays less cash dividends than the non-optimistic group, which is consistent to the finding of Deshmukh et al. (2010) that optimistic managers highly value their cash for investments than as dividends. We highlight another finding: that the optimistic group's cash holdings are significantly more sensitive to the lagged market returns and the lagged variation in market conditions than the non-optimistic group.
The potential explanation is that it is relatively costly for investment-intensive optimistic firms to adjust the flows of investment since their financial policies are less flexible than others. To insure smooth investments when markets are volatile, these investment-intensive optimistic firms prefer to hold high cash balances. This finding is consistent with Brown and Peterson (2011) , who find that R&D smoothing with cash reserves is particularly valued by financially constrained firms. Most importantly, our study is the first to link the characteristic of CEO optimism to the market fluctuation sensitivity of investment-intensive firms. The optimism measure based on firm level data provides new insights into the role of high-investment optimistic firms' cash holdings on investment smoothing.
Finally, we note that by controlling for managerial ownership, CEO optimism slightly impacts the relation between cash holdings and managerial ownership. However, only the coefficient of D*Own is significant (p < 10%) in the case of being in the top quintile investment rate of group for one year.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we examine the CEO optimism effect on cash holdings between 1992 and 2010. Our main results
show that CEO optimism leads firms to save and allocate their cash distinctly from other firms; in particular, their cash holdings are greater and more volatile. This finding is consistent with the opposing incentives to underinvest when external finance undervalues the firm and to overinvest as a manager overestimates future earnings. CEO optimism is found to have a statistically significant effect on corporate cash holding behavior. Our results are robust to alternative optimism measures.
In our examination of the impact of CEO optimism on cash holdings, the cash holdings of firms with optimistic managers are mostly used to fund growth opportunities. These firms save more cash for R&D than firms with nonoptimistic managers. This result is echoed in the time variation in cash holdings that is seen to strongly mirror movements in R&D expenditures for firms with optimistic managers.
21
Further investigation uses a sample without IPO firms as these firms are normally cash rich. We include more control variables step by step in order to further ensure robustness. First, we showed that net issuances play an important role in increasing cash holdings. Since optimistic managers are reluctant to seek for external funds, restricted financing behavior leads them to increase their cash used for investments, such as acquisitions and capital expenditures. Moreover, firms with optimistic managers require less cash reserves for precautionary savings and inventories and receivables. By contrast, firms with non-optimistic managers seem to hold more cash for precautionary savings purposes. Second, we consider debt conservatism in our model and find no evidence that optimistic managers' cash hoarding is related to their preference to use debt conservatively. More notably, we document that optimistic managers hold more cash in bad times than non-optimistic managers do. In other words, the relation between corporate cash policy and CEO optimism is slightly sensitive to the market timing. Our final robustness tests support our main findings and suggest that investment-intensive optimistic firms would hold more cash for investment smoothing than non-optimistic firms. Fig. 2 The distribution of cash for the whole sample including optimistic and non-optimistic managers The sample includes CRSP/Compustat firm-year observations from 1992 to 2010. We define CEOs as optimistic (non-optimistic) if they hold exercisable options that have more (less) than 100% or 67% moneyness. The variable Cash is the cash-to-assets ratio; Q is the market-to-book ratio; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Cashflow is operating income before depreciation minus total interest and related expenses minus total income taxes minus dividends, all divided by total assets; NWC is working capital from balance sheets minus cash and short-term investments, divided by assets; Capex is capital expenditures scaled by total assets; Laglev is the one-year lagged value of total long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets; R&D is R&D expenditures divided by sales; Divdu is a dividend dummy that equals to 1 if a firm pays dividends, otherwise zero; Acq is acquisitions divided by total assets; Indusig is the industry cash flow risk; Own and Own2 are CEO ownership percentage and the square of ownership percentage, respectively. All variable definitions are given in the Appendix 1. The last column reports the t-values of means tests between the optimistic and non-optimistic groups across variables. The respective superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. This table summarizes a set of Pearson correlations matrices for the optimistic and non-optimistic groups, respectively. Correlations among the independent variables and Cash for the optimistic group are above the leading diagonal of the correlation matrix, while the corresponding correlations for the non-optimistic group are below the leading diagonal. Firm-years are in the optimistic group if the manager's option holding moneyness is above 100% (Panel A) or 67% (Panel B); otherwise they are in the non-optimistic groups. Variables include Cash (the cash-to-assets ratio), Q (the market-to-book ratio), Size (the logarithm of total assets), Cashflow (operating income before depreciation minus total interest and related expenses minus total income taxes minus dividends, divided by total assets), NWC (working capital from balance sheet minus cash and short-term investments, divided by assets), Capex (capital expenditures scaled by total assets), Laglev (the one-year lagged value of total long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets), R&D (R&D expenditures divided by sales), Divdu (dividend dummy equal to 1 if a firm pays dividends, otherwise zero), Acq (acquisitions divided by total assets), Indusig (industry cash flow risk), Own (CEO ownership percentage), Own2 (the square of Own), NI (debt issuance plus equity sales minus debt retirement and minus equity repurchases, divided by total assets), the interaction terms (defined as D interacted with each independent variable), Kink (debt conservatism), BHR (the buy-and-hold market returns), lagBHR (one-year lagged BHR), Stdev (the standard deviation of market index returns), and lagStdev (one-year lagged Stdev). All variable definitions are given in the Appendix 1. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This table reports the number of observations and average cash ratios (the mean of each firm-year observation's ratio of cash holdings to total assets) for the full sample and the two sub-samples (optimistic and non-optimistic groups) from 1992 to 2010. We also present the change in (Δ) the average cash ratio for the two sub-samples. The total number of observations in the full sample is 5,903, including an optimistic group of 1,001 and a non-optimistic group of 4,902. After matching with managerial ownership data and estimating the one-year lagged leverage, the effective period for our sample is between 1993 and 2009. 0.528 2451.3*** The dependent variable in all regressions is the cash-to-asset ratio. The independent variables include Q (the market-to-book ratio), Size (the logarithm of total assets), Cashflow (operating income before depreciation minus total interest and related expenses minus total income taxes minus dividends, divided by total assets), NWC (working capital from balance sheet minus cash and short-term investments, divided by assets), Capex (capital expenditures scaled by total assets), Laglev (the one-year lagged value of total long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets), R&D (R&D expenditures divided by sales), Divdu (dividend dummy equal to 1 if a firm pays dividends, otherwise zero), Acq (acquisitions divided by total assets), Indusig (industry cash flow risk), Own (CEO ownership percentage), and Own2 (the square of Own). All variable definitions are given in the Appendix 1. This model includes year and industry fixed effects. The standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 2706.4*** 2691.4*** 1036.9*** 626.9*** The sample includes CEO-year data from ExecuComp and firm-year data from the CRSP/Compustat merged database between 1992 and 2010. We exclude utility firms (SIC codes 4900-4990) and financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6990). For the dependent variable, models 1 and 2 use the cash-to-assets ratio while models 3 and 4 use the absolute change in cash holdings (the difference between current cash ratio and lagged cash ratio). The independent variables include D (CEO optimism dummy), Q (the market-to-book ratio), Size (the logarithm of total assets), Cashflow (operating income before depreciation minus total interest and related expenses minus total income taxes minus dividends, divided by total assets), NWC (working capital from balance sheet minus cash and short-term investments, divided by assets), Capex (capital expenditures scaled by total assets), Lev (total long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets), Laglev (the one-year lagged value of Lev), R&D (R&D expenditures divided by sales), Divdu (dividend dummy equal to 1 if a firm pays dividends, otherwise zero), Acq (acquisitions divided by total assets), Indusig (industry cash flow risk), Own (CEO ownership percentage), Own2 (the square of Own), and the interaction terms (defined as D interacted with each independent variable). All variable definitions are given in the Appendix 1. The standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are reported in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. To save space, this table only displays the results for D and variables interacting with D. All regressions include cash holdings controls, year and industry fixed effects. The full results are available upon request. The dependent variable in all regressions is the cash-to-assets ratio. Firms are sorted separately each year based on three industry-adjusted investment rates: (i) capital, (ii) acquisition, and (iii) R&D. Optimism is defined if the firm belongs to at least one top quintile investment rate group for at least one or two successive years. The reported independent variables include D (CEO optimism dummy), Q (the market-to-book ratio), Size (the logarithm of total assets), Cashflow (cash flow, divided by total assets), NWC (working capital from balance sheet -cash and short-term investments, divided by assets), Capex (capital expenditures scaled by total assets), Laglev (the one-year lagged value of total long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets), R&D (R&D expenditures divided by sales), Divdu (dividend dummy = 1 if a firm pays dividends, otherwise 0), Acq (acquisitions divided by total assets), Indusig (industry cash flow risk), Own (CEO ownership percentage), Own2 (the square of Own), NI (debt issuance + equity sales -debt retirement -equity repurchases, divided by total assets), the interaction terms (D interacted with each independent variable), Kink (debt conservatism), BHR (the buy-and-hold market returns), lagBHR (one-year lagged BHR), Stdev (the standard deviation of market index returns), and lagStdev (one-year lagged Stdev). All variable definitions are given in the Appendix 1. The standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are reported in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. To save space, this table only display the results for variables interacting with the optimism dummy. All regressions include cash holdings controls, Kink controls, market conditions controls, and year and industry fixed effects. The full results are available upon request. The dependent variable in all regressions is the cash-to-assets ratio. The independent variables include D (CEO optimism dummy), Q (the market-to-book ratio), Size (the logarithm of total assets), Cashflow (cash flow, divided by total assets), NWC (working capital from balance sheet minus cash and short-term investments, divided by assets), Capex (capital expenditures scaled by total assets), Laglev (the one-year lagged value of total long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets), R&D (R&D expenditures divided by sales), Divdu (dividend dummy equal to 1 if a firm pays dividends, otherwise zero), Acq (acquisitions divided by total assets), Indusig (industry cash flow risk), Own (CEO ownership percentage), Own2 (the square of Own), NI (debt issuance plus equity sales minus debt retirement and minus equity repurchases, divided by total assets), the interaction terms (defined as D interacted with each independent variable), Kink (debt conservatism). All variable definitions are given in the Appendix 1. The standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are reported in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include cash holdings controls, D*cash holdings controls, and year and industry fixed effects. This 
Fig. 1 Average cash ratios and R&D expenditures ratios of optimistic and non-optimistic groups
